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Assessing the Empirical Upside of
Personalized Criminal Procedure
Matthew B. Kugler† and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz††
Though personalization of law is often viewed as a new idea, pockets of criminal procedure already tolerate it. Many courts have held that Miranda warnings
must be tailored when read to juveniles or people with limited English proficiency;
a suspect’s age is necessarily part of the judicial calculus when determining whether
the police’s questioning of her is a custodial interrogation; and some state courts
consider a person’s demographic characteristics when deciding whether they have
consented to a search. The question before us now is whether society should go further. Should the law of criminal procedure pay more attention to individual differences in privacy expectations, personality, and cognitive abilities? In this Essay, we
adopt an empirical approach, assessing the extent to which the state could meaningfully personalize criminal procedure. Saved for a later day is the normative question
of whether it should.
We conducted a survey on a nationally representative sample of adult Americans
to determine the extent to which factors relevant to criminal procedure law can be
predicted by demographic and personality differences. The data revealed that a
number of factors predict people’s relevant expectations, behaviors, and knowledge.
Women consistently perceive less freedom to refuse consent to a law enforcement
search, whereas those who have been arrested or have a close friend who has been
arrested perceive more freedom to say no. African Americans are more likely to suspect that an officer would draw a weapon or plant evidence in a vehicle during an
encounter with the police. Younger and more educated Americans have stronger expectations of privacy against surveillance than older and less educated people. Older
and more educated Americans, as well as those who have greater exposure to the
criminal justice system, have a better understanding of their Miranda rights than
their younger, less educated, and less experienced counterparts. Various ideological
and personality factors also correlate with divergent responses. That said, in no instances are demographic and personality considerations hugely predictive. Models
incorporating a wide range of predictors typically explained less than 10 percent of
the observed variation in individual behavior, expectations, and attitudes. Although
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we have not tested all approaches to criminal procedure personalization, our empirical investigation of traditional techniques suggests data-driven efforts to personalize criminal procedure may not be worth the trouble.
This data-driven approach does shed light on another issue in criminal procedure, however. In a long line of cases, courts have had to decide whether deviations
from the standard script for Miranda warnings warranted the exclusion of confessions. We tested several versions of the Miranda warning, including one deemed inadequate in a recent case. We found no differences in comprehension either overall
or among respondents at increased risk of misunderstanding their rights (younger
respondents and the less well educated). We believe that this experimental approach
provides a valuable method of evaluating the appropriateness of nonstandard
Miranda warnings.

INTRODUCTION
Imagine a person is being questioned by the police. If this is
a mere friendly chat, then the police need not advise that person
of her rights. If, however, this is a “custodial interrogation,” then
the person—the suspect—must generally be given a Miranda
warning for any incriminating statements she makes to be admissible in court. Certain factors seem obviously relevant to the determination of whether the interrogation was custodial: Did the
conversation occur in a locked room at the station? Was the officer
asking the questions armed? And so on. But should the courts and
police also consider the characteristics of the suspect? The Supreme
Court in J.D.B. v North Carolina1 held that the age of the person
being questioned is necessarily relevant to a determination of
whether the interrogation was custodial too, at least in the case
of juveniles.2 It left unresolved the question of whether other personal characteristics also must be considered.
The Court in J.D.B. took a step toward what we call the personalization of criminal procedure. By personalization we mean
tailoring the law’s content on the basis of a person’s individual
characteristics. The sort of personalization we have in mind is, for
the most part, not based on an individual’s own previous behavior—though such personalization has arisen in the doctrine occasionally thanks to either a police officer’s memory of previous interactions or technological developments that facilitate

1
2

564 US 261 (2011).
Id at 277.
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information sharing among officers.3 Instead, we consider personalization on the basis of group characteristics, looking to the attitudes, behaviors, and expectations of similar others.
In recent years, the personalization of law has become a hot
topic, one that has now sparked its first law review symposium.
But to date, and even in this Symposium, personalization proposals have largely focused on private law.4 Here, we examine
whether the kind of personalization described in J.D.B. is warranted in different domains of criminal procedure. The question
of whether public law in general, and constitutionalized bodies of
doctrine like criminal procedure in particular, ought to be personalized on the basis of immutable traits has scarcely been addressed. Such personalization raises obvious hard normative and
constitutional questions.5 Before we consider those questions,
however, we should consider whether personalization would lead
to meaningfully better accuracy. If demographics do not substantially predict attitudes, expectations, and beliefs in criminal procedure, then the benefits of tailoring this area of law are unlikely
to be large enough to make the game worth the candle. For this
3
For an illustration of this sort of personalization, compare United States v Taylor,
511 F3d 87, 92 (1st Cir 2007) (holding that the suspect’s evident nervousness during an
interaction with a police officer created reasonable suspicion because in previous interactions with the same officer the suspect had been calm), with United States v McKoy, 428
F3d 38, 41 (1st Cir 2005) (holding that nervousness alone during an interaction with a
police officer is not enough to generate reasonable suspicion).
4
See generally, for example, Anthony J. Casey and Anthony Niblett, The Death of
Rules and Standards, 92 Ind L J 1401 (2017); Omri Ben-Shahar and Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91 NYU L Rev 627 (2016); Ariel Porat and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz,
Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data, 112 Mich L Rev 1417 (2014);
Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U Pa L Rev 1 (2013).
Other recent scholarship examines algorithmic decision-making’s role in determining
whether reasonable or individualized suspicion exists. Such decision-making is a form of
personalized policing policy. See generally, for example, Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big
Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U Pa L Rev 327 (2015); Elizabeth E. Joh,
Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 Wash L Rev 35 (2014);
Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth
Amendment, 164 U Pa L Rev 871 (2016). Our interest here is the related but distinct topic
of personalized legal doctrine.
5
We recognize that such personalization on the basis of race may well be subject to
strict scrutiny under existing law. See Johnson v California, 543 US 499, 509 (2005) (applying strict scrutiny to a prison policy of initially placing new inmates with cellmates of
the same race). As we hope will become apparent, we are interested in examining whether
data-driven personalization on the basis of race might be used to promote equal treatment
in a criminal justice system that systematically disadvantages discrete and insular minorities. Note that some courts have been open to the possibility of using immutable characteristics to inform algorithmic decision-making. See State v Loomis, 881 NW2d 749, 765–
67 (Wis 2016) (finding no due process violation in bail algorithm that considered gender
to be a relevant factor in assessing recidivism risk).
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reason, we largely sidestep the normative questions in this Essay
and focus on the empirical.
After gathering data on several potential candidates for personalization, we have not found evidence to indicate that the benefits from personalizing criminal procedure law are particularly
large. To be sure, that could change if the American public becomes substantially more polarized than it already is. But a perhaps surprising takeaway from our research is that, for many
questions involving criminal procedure attitudes and expectations, people are people. Though Americans do disagree on these
issues, that disagreement is not substantially predicted by their
social categories.
I. BACKGROUND
The empirical study of Fourth Amendment attitudes has entered its adolescence. Several teams of researchers, each with
their own particular methodology and primary topics of interest,
compete to map out the privacy expectations of ordinary Americans.
Sometimes, as in the recently decided cell-site geolocation case of
Carpenter v United States,6 the research sends a single coherent
message: more people expect privacy in such and such domain
than do not. But even when an overwhelming majority of people
expect privacy in a given context, there is usually a meaningful
minority who do not. And this minority is somewhat identifiable;
the existing literature has revealed that sometimes personality
and demographic factors are correlated with privacy attitudes.7
It is not just in the privacy expectations context that we
might encounter meaningful demographic variation. Some research studies indicate that African American citizens are more
likely to be unnerved by the proximate presence of police officers
6
138 S Ct 2206 (2018). We helped write an amicus brief in this case citing data from a
number of researchers in this field. See Brief of Amici Curiae Empirical Fourth Amendment
Scholars in Support of Petitioner, Carpenter v United States, No 16-402 (US filed Aug 14,
2017) (available on Westlaw at 2017 WL 3530963). The papers containing these data included
Bernard Chao, et al, Why Courts Fail to Protect Privacy: Race, Age, Bias, and Technology,
106 Cal L Rev 263, 297–98 (2018); Alisa Smith, Sean Madden, and Robert P. Barton, An
Empirical Examination of Societal Expectations of Privacy in the Digital Age of GPS, Cell
Phone Towers, and Drones, 26 Albany L J Sci & Tech 111, 133 (2016); Matthew Tokson,
Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy, 111 Nw U L Rev 139, 177 (2016); Matthew B.
Kugler and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations of Privacy, Fourth Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory, 2015 S Ct Rev 205, 259; and Christine S. Scott-Hayward,
Henry F. Fradella, and Ryan G. Fischer, Does Privacy Require Secrecy? Societal Expectations of Privacy in the Digital Age, 43 Am J Crim L 19, 52–53 (2015).
7
See Kugler and Strahilevitz, 2015 S Ct Rev at 262–63 (cited in note 6).
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than their Caucasian counterparts, and tragic, well-publicized instances of police misconduct that victimized African American citizens underscore a potential source of those demographic differences.8 It also has long been suggested that African Americans
understandably go to great lengths in traffic stops to project calm
and avoid provoking confrontations with police.9 Should we ignore
this backdrop of racial disparities when assessing whether a
given interaction with the police was free of improper coercion?
A host of other Fourth Amendment questions could also implicate demographic differences: Which interactions with law enforcement are suspicious, and which are normal? Do different
kinds of people feel equally free to refuse when police ask permission to search their property or stop them for questioning? Do
Americans from different backgrounds understand their Miranda
rights in the same way after hearing them read?
Perhaps surprisingly, there is little scholarship that considers this kind of group- and demographic-based personalization of
criminal procedure law in any depth.10 There is one well-done article from the early 1990s that discussed racial disparities in consent and reasonable suspicion cases. It noted that many African
American males regard their interactions with law enforcement
quite warily and may regard themselves as having been seized,
rather than free to leave, when stopped by the police.11 The author
insisted that he was not advocating and would not advocate for a
“separate” Fourth Amendment for black men. Considering the
possibility briefly, he wrote: “Nothing could be further from the

8
See David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the
Fourth Amendment, 1997 S Ct Rev 271, 312–16 (describing the police harassment experienced by African American motorists).
9
See, for example, Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 Mich
L Rev 946, 953–54 (2002).
10 In a way, all criminal procedure is personalized. For instance, the reasonable suspicion standard calls for “particularized suspicion” based on a suspect’s actions and demeanor, among other factors. Illinois v Wardlow, 528 US 119, 124 (2000). Here we are
discussing personalization based on less immediate, and more statistically driven, factors.
11 Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters”—Some Preliminary Thoughts about
Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 Valp U L Rev 243, 250–56 (1991).
See also Sklansky, 1997 S Ct Rev at 327–29 (cited in note 8) (“What the recent vehicle stop
cases suggest that Fourth Amendment law needs is not a special rule to protect minority
groups, but more attention to the special concerns of minority groups in the formulation
and application of all Fourth Amendment rules.”); Jeffrey Fagan, et al, Stops and Stares:
Street Stops, Surveillance, and Race in the New Policing, 43 Fordham Urban L J 539, 560
(2016) (“Recent empirical evidence on police stops supports perceptions among minority
citizens that police disproportionately stop African American and Hispanic motorists, and
that once stopped, these citizens are more likely to be searched or arrested.”).
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truth.”12 But he did want courts to consider target race along with
other factors when assessing the voluntariness of a search.13
Along somewhat similar lines, a note from 2001 argued that the
law should incorporate a “reasonable Black person” standard into
Fourth Amendment doctrine governing Terry stops.14 The note is
also thoughtful, but it limits its analysis to Terry stops. Another
project that gathered empirical data on “free to leave” expectations proposed a “reasonable person of similar age” and “reasonable person of the same gender” standard in response to observed
differences on those dimensions.15 As best we can tell, no research
paper has ever drilled down empirically to examine the extent of
racial and other demographic differences across a host of germane
criminal procedure contexts.
II. CURRENT LAW AND TRENDS
Though there are obvious problems under the Fourteenth
Amendment with treating citizens differently based on their demographic characteristics, current doctrine actually requires it in some
domains. As we note in the Introduction, in J.D.B., the Supreme
Court held that courts must consider the age of a juvenile when
determining whether an interrogation is custodial and therefore
triggers the Miranda rights of the person being questioned.16
Writing for the Court, Justice Sonia Sotomayor said that youth
would always be associated with increased susceptibility to outside pressure and that a child’s age would be relatively easy for
police to discern.17 It would, then, not be fair to hold children to
the same standard as adults. She distinguished tailoring based
on age versus tailoring driven by other factors, noting that requiring the police to anticipate “the idiosyncrasies of every individual
suspect and divining how those particular traits affect each person’s subjective state of mind” would be unwise.18
Reasonable as that sounds, such tailoring raises substantial
line-drawing problems. Justice Samuel Alito’s dissent in J.D.B.
12

Maclin, 26 Valp U L Rev at 272 (cited in note 11).
Id.
14 Mia Carpiniello, Note, Striking a Sincere Balance: A Reasonable Black Person
Standard for “Location plus Evasion” Terry Stops, 6 Mich J Race & L 355, 357–58 (2001).
15 See David K. Kessler, Free to Leave? An Empirical Look at the Fourth Amendment’s Seizure Standard, 99 J Crim Law & Crimin 51, 85 (2009). For further discussion
see note 38 and accompanying text.
16 J.D.B., 564 US at 277.
17 Id at 275, 279.
18 Id at 271.
13
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expressed alarm at the majority’s rejection of what had previously
been an “objective reasonable-person standard,”19 and he harbored
“little doubt that today’s decision will soon be cited by defendants—and perhaps by prosecutors as well—for the proposition that
all manner of other individual characteristics should be treated like
age and taken into account in the Miranda custody calculus.”20
Justice Alito named a suspect’s intelligence, cultural background,
and education as potentially relevant factors after J.D.B.21
Custodial interrogations are hardly the only body of doctrine
in which courts have embraced personalization. Individuals walking through “high crime neighborhoods” have, as a legal matter,
fewer protections against police stops and seizures than those
walking through ritzier areas.22 So too do individuals who happen
to be near the US border with Mexico.23 And it should not be remotely surprising that African Americans and Latinos, respectively, are more likely to be searched as a result of these quasipersonalized Fourth Amendment doctrines.24 Though it may not
be readily apparent, this is a form of personalization precisely because of the nonrandom draw of people who are likely to be present in these spaces. Proximity to the southern border or to high
crime neighborhoods is a proxy for race, however imperfect.25 If
Fourth Amendment and Equal Protection doctrine can stomach
those kinds of racially disparate effects, surely there is some room
for doctrinal moves that are likely to enhance the privacy rights
of racial minorities rather than diminishing them.
This question of personalization has already arisen in consent searches. Here the federal courts are also generally resistant
to personalization, employing a reasonable person standard rather than examining subjectively what the defendant in a criminal case actually knew or expected when asked for permission to

19

Id at 287 (Alito dissenting).
J.D.B., 564 US at 292 (Alito dissenting).
21 Id at 291–92 (Alito dissenting).
22 See David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor
Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 Ind L J 659, 671–72, 681 (1994).
23 See, for example, United States v Martinez-Fuerte, 428 US 543, 562–63 (1976) (allowing stops of automotive travelers at fixed checkpoints near the border without individualized suspicion).
24 See Harris, 69 Ind L J at 680–81 (cited in note 22).
25 See Lindsey Barrett, Reasonably Suspicious Algorithms: Predictive Policing at the
United States Border, 41 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 327, 356–58 (2017). See also Harris,
69 Ind L J at 681 (cited in note 22).
20
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search.26 But some state supreme courts interpret their state constitutions to focus on the particular defendant’s subjective understanding, opening up space for personalization.27 And personalization was, and to some extent still is, common in assessing the
voluntariness of confessions. Courts historically examined confession voluntariness using a totality of the circumstances test28 and
have considered individualizing factors like suspect age, health,
and intelligence.29 Indeed, prior to Miranda, the voluntariness
test used to determine the admissibility of confessions was very
context sensitive, with the courts applying a standard that could
be tailored to the circumstances of any particular interrogation—
one that critics felt rendered the law insufficiently predictable.30
Consider some tantalizing personalization possibilities: If
men feel more freedom to refuse an officer’s request to search
their belongings than do women, perhaps in cases when it is ambiguous whether consent was given, the tie-breaking rule should
be “yes” for men but “no” for women. If highly educated people
know their Miranda rights but poorly educated people do not,
then maybe a failure to Mirandize someone before an interrogation should lead to exclusion of evidence obtained from a poorly
educated person in custody but not of the same evidence obtained
from someone with more education. We could even imagine some
versions of Miranda working better for certain kinds of people, a
criminal procedure application of previous proposals for personalized disclosure.31 Maybe reasonable expectations of privacy
should be determined based on the expectations held by people
demographically similar to the defendant in a particular surveillance case. And, to return to the custodial interrogation context
and Justice Alito’s slippery slope,32 maybe age, education, cultural
background, and intelligence can be incorporated into judicial determinations of whether a suspect has been taken into custody.

26

See, for example, United States v Drayton, 536 US 194, 202 (2002).
See, for example, State v Blair, 396 P3d 908, 914 (Or 2017).
28 See, for example, Spano v New York, 360 US 315, 323 (1959).
29 See Paul Marcus, It’s Not Just about Miranda: Determining the Voluntariness of
Confessions in Criminal Prosecutions, 40 Valp U L Rev 601, 627–34 (2006). But see Richard
A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99 Mich L Rev 1000,
1021 (2001) (arguing that the focus has shifted largely to the voluntariness of Miranda
waivers).
30 See, for example, Eve Brensike Primus, The Future of Confession Law: Toward
Rules for the Voluntariness Test, 114 Mich L Rev 1, 10–12 (2015).
31 See Porat and Strahilevitz, 112 Mich L Rev at 1470–76 (cited in note 4).
32 See text accompanying note 20.
27
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III. THE STUDY
The greater our ability to predict the heterogeneity in the
overall population, the greater the potential upside from personalizing law. We therefore sought to determine how easy it is to predict
people’s attitudes, beliefs, and expectations on criminal procedure–
related issues from demographic and personality factors.
We sampled a census-representative mix of twelve hundred
adult Americans and included a wide array of demographic and
personality measures.33 These included traditional factors, such
as race, sex, age, educational attainment, self-assessed social
class, and region; these are the kinds of information that can be
readily deduced from public records. We also administered two
psychological inventories: a shortened version of the Big Five
questionnaire as well as a measure of authoritarianism.34 This
kind of information is not directly available to law enforcement,
but one can predict core personality traits somewhat accurately
using big data.35 Our survey instrument used written instructions
and questions rather than oral ones, both for practical reasons
and because the literature suggests that, in at least one of the

33 Full demographics are reported in Appendix A. The sample was recruited by
Toluna, a well-regarded survey research firm that we have used in our previous research.
The survey was administered online using Qualtrics. For gender identity, participants
could select male or female or fill in their own answer. Two participants filled in an answer. Because this is such a small number that we could not add a category for them, we
left them in the analysis and coded them as Female = 0. The original sample contained
1,253 participants, but data from 53 were discarded due to abnormally fast completion
times (less than half the median).
34 The Big Five scale used was developed by Samuel D. Gosling, Peter J. Rentfrow, and
William B. Swann Jr, A Very Brief Measure of the Big-Five Personality Domains, 37 J Rsrch
Personality 504, 525 (2003). The Big Five categorizes people among five essential measures
of personality—extraversion, neuroticism, conscientiousness, openness to new experiences,
and agreeableness. The authoritarianism scale is authoritarian submission, developed by
John Duckitt, et al, A Tripartite Approach to Right-Wing Authoritarianism: The Authoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism Model, 31 Polit Psychology 685, 711–12 (2010).
35 See, for example, Gokul Chittaranjan, Jan Blom, and Daniel Gatica-Perez, Mining
Large-Scale Smartphone Data for Personality Studies, 17 Personal & Ubiquitous Computing
433, 447–48 (2013); Baiyun Chen and Justin Marcus, Students’ Self-Presentation on Facebook:
An Examination of Personality and Self-Construal Factors, 28 Computers in Hum Behav
2091, 2097 (2012); Tracii Ryan and Sophia Xenos, Who Uses Facebook? An Investigation
into the Relationship between the Big Five, Shyness, Narcissism, Loneliness, and Facebook
Usage, 27 Computers in Hum Behav 1658, 1662–63 (2011). Notably, no study has perfectly
predicted these dimensions from other data. But granting the model this information poses
a conservative test for our generally skeptical take on personalization.
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contexts we are studying, written information is more likely to be
retained by research subjects.36
Our data collection focused on three broad classes of criminal
procedure issues.37 The first involves perceived freedom to choose.
When a law enforcement officer approaches and makes a request
to conduct an interview or perform a search, does the target believe she can say no? Prior research in this area has found that
people often do not feel free to decline, but this work has been
conducted on convenience samples and has not been well-suited
to detecting demographic differences.38 Based on a considerable
literature in psychology, one might expect to find that people of
the middle and upper classes would view themselves as having
more choice.39 Personality, as measured through the “Big Five”
framework that has dominated social psychological research for
decades, could also be predictive.40 One might also predict that—
consistent with prior findings from nonrepresentative samples—
gender will matter, as women tend to score higher on the psychological personality dimension of “agreeableness”41 and may feel
more physically vulnerable to requests from members of a predominantly male police force.

36 See Richard Rogers, et al, Investigating the Effects of Repeated Miranda Warnings:
Do They Perform a Curative Function on Common Miranda Misconceptions?, 31 Behav Sci
& L 397, 403 (2013).
37 The study began with the demographic measures and then moved to the consent
search and expectation of privacy measures, which were administered in random order.
After those measures were completed, participants received blocks of personality questions and the Miranda items. They then completed one final consent search scenario and
a few sensitive demographic questions that asked whether they or a close associate had
ever been arrested.
38 See, for example, Kessler, 99 J Crim L & Crimin at 68–69 (cited in note 15) (using
sample consisting of approximately four hundred residents of Boston stopped on the
street). David Kessler’s work did show some demographic effects, including one consistent
with the pattern we observe on gender. See id at 77. But Kessler is quick to point out that
the sample was nonrepresentative in many respects. See id at 72–73.
39 See, for example, Michael W. Kraus, Jacinth J.X. Tan, and Melanie B. Tannenbaum,
The Social Ladder: A Rank-Based Perspective on Social Class, 24 Psychological Inquiry
81, 84 (2013) (“For upper-class individuals, chronic elevated rank perceptions may increase expectations of personal control, choice, and autonomy within interactions, even in
the absence of actual control or autonomy.”).
40 For discussion of the use of the Big Five to measure revealed preferences and behavioral tendencies, see Murray R. Barrick and Michael K. Mount, The Big Five Personality
Dimensions and Job Performance: A Meta-analysis, 44 Personnel Psychology 1, 17–19 (1991).
41 See, for example, Yanna J. Weisberg, Colin G. DeYoung, and Jacob B. Hirsh, Gender Differences in Personality across the Ten Aspects of the Big Five, 2 Frontiers in Psychology 1, 8 (2011).
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We ran two regression models for each major dependent variable in the consent searches and expectations of privacy domains. The first model contained only basic demographic information, most of which would be accessible to the government in
one form or another. The second model added a variety of personality factors, testing whether somewhat more sophisticated tailoring would produce substantially greater explanatory power.
For the Miranda vignette, we ran further models to test whether
our differing versions of the Miranda warning produced varying
levels of comprehension.
A. Consent Searches and Feelings regarding Police
Interactions
The study included three consent-search vignettes. One of
these involved a car search. After completing the ticket-writing
business of a traffic stop, a police officer says, “Do you mind if I
search the trunk of your car?” The others involved being stopped
and asked to answer questions in two different locations: on the
street and on an intercity bus that was stopped at a station. In
each case, participants were presented with a vignette based on
a hypothetical police interaction and asked how free they would
feel to decline the officer’s request on a five-point scale that
ranged from 1 (“Not at all free” to refuse to answer questions or
to refuse permission) to 5 (“Completely free” to refuse to answer
questions or to refuse permission).
For simplicity of data analysis, these three items were averaged together to create a composite (α = 0.75), and we conducted
a series of regression analyses to predict this composite score from
a variety of demographic factors. Though several factors are related to perceived freedom to decline, most of these relationships
are quite weak. Being African American or Hispanic increases
perceived freedom to decline by about 0.2 points on the five-point
scale. Having been arrested oneself or having a close friend or
family member who had been arrested also increases perceived
freedom by a similar magnitude.42 These effects (unlike education

42 In our sample, 21 percent of respondents reported having been arrested and 49
percent reported having had a close associate who had been arrested. Some other recent
research estimates that arrest is more common than that, with a recent study suggesting
that about 30 percent of US adults have been arrested by the age of thirty-four. See J.C.
Barnes, et al, Arrest Prevalence in a National Sample of Adults: The Role of Sex and
Race/Ethnicity, 40 Am J Crim Just 457, 460 (2015). The prevalence of youth arrests has
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levels, interestingly enough) all move participants in the direction
of greater doctrinal accuracy—people can refuse in each of these
cases—so this may be a case of those with greater reason to know
their rights being more aware of the legal rule. The strongest effect, however, is on gender, as Table 1 reveals. Women perceive
less freedom to decline by between 0.3 and 0.4 points, much larger
than the other effects. Social class, which the psychological literature had led us to believe would be relevant, did not have a significant effect.
TABLE 1: PERCEIVED FREEDOM TO REFUSE A SEARCH
Model 1 (R2 = 0.038)
Model 2 (R2 = 0.060)
Unstd Coeff Std Coeff Unstd Coeff Std Coeff
(Constant)
Female
Hispanic

2.698 (0.249)

3.387 (0.451)

−0.381 (0.073) −0.156 *** −0.317 (0.076) −0.130 ***
0.223 (0.100)

0.070 *

0.207 (0.100)

0.065 *

African American 0.259 (0.111)

0.072 *

0.200 (0.112)

0.055

Education

−0.019 (0.037) −0.017

−0.036 (0.037) −0.032

Social Class

0.075 (0.042)

0.058

0.043 (0.042)

0.033

Age

0.005 (0.002)

0.066 *

0.004 (0.002)

0.052

Midwest

0.013 (0.109)

0.004

0.007 (0.109)

0.003

South

0.014 (0.097)

0.006

0.021 (0.097)

0.008

West

0.062 (0.111)

0.020

0.050 (0.111)

0.016

Self/Friend
Arrested
Agreeableness

0.198 (0.071)

0.081 **

0.198 (0.071)

0.081 **

−0.094 (0.038) −0.085 *

Extroversion

0.039 (0.027)

0.042

Conscientious

0.077 (0.037)

0.071 *

Neuroticism

−0.105 (0.032) −0.114 ***

Openness

−0.010 (0.033) −0.010

Authoritarianism

−0.066 (0.044) −0.048

Conservatism

0.025 (0.022)

0.036

Note: Northeast was used as the regional reference group. *** indicates
p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Conservatism was measured on a scale ranging from 1 (Very Liberal) to 7 (Very Conservative). The Big Five scales ranged
from 1 to 7; authoritarianism ranged from 1 to 6.

Notably, even this broad array of demographic factors explains only 3.8 percent of the variance in perceived freedom to
increased substantially over the past several decades. See Robert Brame, et al, Cumulative
Prevalence of Arrest from Ages 8 to 23 in a National Sample, 129 Pediatrics 21, 23 (2012).
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decline. A model that incorporates psychological factors—the Big
Five, authoritarianism, and conservativism—as well as demographics has greater predictive power. Model 2 shows significant effects on Big Five neuroticism and agreeableness—both the
more neurotic and the more agreeable see less freedom to decline—and on conscientiousness, which is associated with increased perceived freedom. But even adding the full array of personality factors increases the variance explained to only 6.0
percent. Our ability to explain individual differences is therefore
modest.
To make this more concrete, let us look at the gender effect
on the individual scenarios. There we see between 45 percent and
63 percent of men saying they would generally have felt free to
leave or refuse to answer questions, but only between 35 percent
and 50 percent of women. Table 2 displays these results.
TABLE 2: PERCEIVED FREEDOM TO REFUSE A SEARCH BASED ON
GENDER

Male
Street
Stop
Stop
on Bus
Trunk
Search

Female

Position Relative to Midpoint
Male
Female
Under
Over
Under
Over

3.26

(1.46)

2.93

(1.44)

31%

45%

39%

35%

3.28

(1.47)

2.94

(1.50)

31%

47%

40%

36%

3.78

(1.45)

3.39

(1.53)

19%

63%

30%

50%

Note: Perceived freedom was measured on a 1 to 5 scale with a midpoint of 3. Higher
numbers indicate greater perceived freedom.

Whether this difference between genders has normative significance depends on where one sets one’s threshold. For both
women and men, a substantial minority say they would not feel
free to decline in the street and bus stop questions. Slightly more
men say that they would feel free versus not, and for women the
numbers are narrowly in the other direction. If one ignores gender differences, then the overall result is a 5 percentage-point difference in favor of perceiving freedom. That isn’t wildly out of line
with the results for either individual gender. On the car stop, gender has less practical impact. More women and more men feel
that they can decline the officer’s request to search the car’s trunk
than feel that they must acquiesce.
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These results highlight a recurring problem in privacy surveys. We do not yet have an overarching theory about thresholds,
whether we mean global thresholds (Do enough people want privacy here that we should protect it?) or personalization thresholds
(Are people different enough that we should distinguish between
them?). Here, we think the percentage of variance explained is a
useful measure on the personalization threshold. People differ in
their perceptions of freedom to choose, but even considering all of
these factors explains only a small piece of the puzzle. The issue
of global thresholds is very likely context dependent, and we will
hold our thoughts on that question for another day.
In addition to the question of perceived freedom to refuse, we
were also interested in the overall dynamic of the police interaction. How nervous do different people think they would feel upon
being stopped by the police? Here we were limited in part by the
hypothetical nature of the questions. Asking how nervous people
think they would feel when being stopped by the police is different
than measuring their emotional reactions as they occur during a
real interaction. Nevertheless, the data are interesting, and we
report these analyses in Appendix B. First, the race effects observed on the other measures we discuss below are absent on expected nervousness. This is particularly surprising given the literature on traffic stops of African Americans.43 Women and more
educated respondents, however, report that they think they
would be more nervous during the interaction. But these bare demographics explain only 2.2 percent of the variance. When personality variables are included in the analysis, we observe an effect of neuroticism—associated with increased expected
nervousness—as well as smaller effects for agreeableness (increased nervousness) and extroversion (decreased). People who
score higher on authoritarianism also expect that they will be less
nervous. This model explains 10.9 percent of the observed variation, or 8.7 percent more than the mere demographics. So psychological measures of personality help explain who expects to feel
more anxious when encountering the police, but only to a limited
degree.44
Given the increased attention paid to the possibility of police
misconduct in the wake of the Black Lives Matter movement, we
43

See notes 11–15 and accompanying text.
Notably, one of the neuroticism items asked participants whether they would describe themselves as “anxious, easily upset.” This is as direct a measure as you would ever
be likely to have.
44
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also asked respondents about two other topics: whether it was
likely the police officer would draw a gun during the interaction,
and whether—if given the chance—it was likely the officer would
plant evidence. These questions were answered on five-point
scales ranging from 1 (Extremely Unlikely) to 5 (Extremely
Likely). Because the mere presentation of these possibilities had the
potential to bias other responses, these questions were asked only
for one search, the car stop, and that vignette was administered at
the very end of our survey. We present these results in Appendices C
and D. For both types of misconduct, African Americans and
younger respondents thought it much more likely that police
would behave in these ways, and those scoring high on authoritarian personality dimensions thought such police behavior was
much less likely. The African American effect here is rather large.
The overall mean for the weapon question was 2.13. Being African
American increased the estimate to 2.87. Similarly, on the estimate for the planting evidence question, the jump was from 2.28
to 2.98. These are the only questions for which bare demographics
explain a meaningful amount of the variance (10.7 percent for the
weapon being drawn, 7.4 percent for planting evidence). The previously observed effects of gender and neuroticism were entirely
absent. Even more interesting, there were no effects related to the
displayed race of the officer on any of these questions.45
There is a puzzle when we aggregate this data. While African
Americans viewed police drawing a weapon or planting evidence
as markedly more likely, they did not describe themselves as being more nervous during the hypothetical police questioning or
police request scenarios that appeared earlier in the survey.
Wouldn’t the fear of a deadly encounter or being framed make one
more nervous in interactions with the police? It would seem so,
but we can envision three reasons that may explain why that result did not show up in the data. First, it may be that members of

45 For the car stop, the vignette was accompanied by a picture of a white or African
American male officer leaning over a car’s driver-side door, with random variation of the
police officer’s race. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted using officer race and
the survey participant’s identification as either African American or not as predictors.
Neither officer race nor the interaction between officer race and participant race approached significance for any of these measures (all Fs < 1). For the street stop, a picture
of a white officer in front of a fence was displayed to all participants. No picture was shown
for the bus stop.
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different racial groups are more or less reluctant to admit nervousness even if they feel it.46 In that sense, there could be a limit
to what one can do with surveys rather than physiological
measures like saliva cortisol levels or expensive technologies like
fMRI.47 Second, it could be that statements about police mistrust
or misconduct provided a particularly powerful prime to African
Americans in the environment of late 2017. That is, the mention
of police officers drawing weapons unnecessarily or planting evidence to incriminate an innocent suspect had a substantial effect
on African Americans (relative to members of other groups), causing them to assign comparatively high ratings on those measures.
Perhaps African Americans would have reported substantially
more nervousness if we’d asked them to rate their anxiety after
we asked about police misconduct. Finally, it may be that a higher
percentage of African Americans have become desensitized to encounters with police, in part because they have been stopped and
pulled over more regularly than members of other racial groups.48
African Americans may have adopted coping mechanisms out of
necessity or developed adaptive preferences, resulting in a kind
of fatalism that calms nerves even amid terrifying scenarios
springing to mind during encounters with law enforcement.
B. Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
The subject of reasonable expectations of privacy has been a
focus of our research for the past several years.49 Borrowing from
the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment decision in Katz v
United States,50 our general approach is to describe a potential
46 See Jennifer K. Bosson, Ethan L. Haymovitz, and Elizabeth C. Pinel, When Saying
and Doing Diverge: The Effects of Stereotype Threat on Self-Reported versus Non-verbal
Anxiety, 40 J Exper Soc Psychology 247, 253 (2004) (reporting on an experiment in which
gay men who were reminded of their stigmatized status before interacting with children
did not express greater anxiety about those interactions when surveyed but did display
greater nonverbal indicators of anxiety); Robert J. Edelmann and Sarah R. Baker, SelfReported and Actual Physiological Responses in Social Phobia, 41 British J Clinical Psychology 1, 10 (2002) (noting experimental subjects’ discrepancies between self-assessed
anxiety and physical manifestations of anxiety).
47 We wonder how feasible it would be to simulate an arrest of an experimental subject in an fMRI machine. An officer entering a room containing a giant magnet might be
wise to leave her weapon behind!
48 See, for example, Patricia Warren, et al, Driving while Black: Bias Processes and
Racial Disparity in Police Stops, 44 Criminology 709, 728 (2006).
49 See generally Matthew B. Kugler and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth
Amendment Circularity, 84 U Chi L Rev 1747 (2017); Kugler and Strahilevitz, 2015 S Ct
Rev 205 (cited in note 6).
50 389 US 347 (1967).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227065

2019]

Personalized Criminal Procedure

505

search and ask whether it would violate privacy expectations for
law enforcement to conduct it.51 For instance, in this study we
asked, “Would it violate people’s reasonable expectations of privacy if law enforcement: Installed a video camera to watch a public park where criminal activity has recently occurred?” Participants respond to these questions on a 1 (Definitely Not) to 5
(Definitely Yes) scale. For this survey we included the questions
used in one of our prior papers52 plus several new ones. Our past
work in this area has not explored demographic differences in privacy expectations in any sustained way, though in one prior paper
we noted a relationship between expectations and age: those who
were older had lower expectations of privacy in the GPS tracking
context.53 Demographic factors that correlate with divergent expectations of privacy are the subject of a recent article by Professor
Bernard Chao and coauthors.54 They find that African Americans
were more likely to regard police conduct as violating reasonable
expectations of privacy, as were Caucasians who had previously
been searched or investigated by law enforcement.55
Table 3 displays the means for each of our reasonable expectation of privacy questions as well as the percentage of subjects
placing themselves below and above the midpoint for each. Again,
the ratings on the individual items were averaged to create a single composite (α = 0.85), and the same multiple regression was
conducted on these data. This analysis is presented in Table 4.

51 A majority of the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the vitality of the Katz test
in determining whether police surveillance amounts to a search. See Carpenter, 138 S Ct
at 2227.
52 Kugler and Strahilevitz, 2015 S Ct Rev at 260 (cited in note 6).
53 Id at 252.
54 Chao, et al, 106 Cal L Rev at 310–15 (cited in note 6).
55 Id at 310–11.
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TABLE 3: REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY RATINGS
M

Below

Above

Ratio:
(Above/Below)

Remote activate webcam
Obtain emails from ISP

4.17
3.71

(1.39)
(1.42)

15%
20%

76%
61%

4.98
3.02

Facial recognition at
Super Bowl

2.58

(1.52)

53%

29%

0.55

Camera in public park
Cell-site location data

2.22
3.29

(1.49)
(1.45)

65%
30%

22%
46%

0.34
1.53

Stingray cellphone
tracking

3.53

(1.44)

24%

53%

2.19

Uber trip history
Camera through home
window

3.36
3.94

(1.46)
(1.41)

28%
18%

49%
69%

1.76
3.79

Drone backyard pictures

3.65

(1.44)

22%

59%

2.67

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. The questions appeared in random order and are reproduced verbatim in Appendix E.

Here, age and educational attainment are the strongest predictors of privacy expectations. The younger and the more educated had higher privacy expectations than the older and less educated. As Table 4 shows, sex, race and ethnicity, and arrest
experience are entirely unrelated to privacy expectations. When
the personality factors are added in Model 2, there is a moderately strong effect of authoritarianism—more authoritarian participants had lower privacy expectations. This effect reduced the
strength of the age and education effects, making education nonsignificant.
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TABLE 4: PREDICTORS OF PRIVACY EXPECTATIONS
Model 1 (R2 = 0.025)
Unstd Coeff
(Constant)

3.369 (0.137)

Female

0.055 (0.059)

Hispanic

Std Coeff

Model 2 (R2 = 0.058)
Unstd Coeff

Std Coeff

3.664

(0.331)

0.028

0.067

(0.061)

0.034

0.074 (0.082)

0.029

0.021

(0.081)

0.008

African American

0.115 (0.090)

0.039

0.063

(0.090)

0.021

Education

0.073 (0.027)

0.080 **

0.038

(0.027)

0.042

−0.006 (0.002)

−0.096 **

−0.004

(0.002)

Age
Midwest

−0.077 *

0.009 (0.089)

0.004

0.010

(0.088)

0.004

South

−0.062 (0.079)

−0.031

−0.027

(0.079)

−0.013

West

−0.093 (0.091)

−0.038

−0.085

(0.090)

−0.035

0.092 (0.058)

0.047

0.064

(0.057)

0.033

Agreeableness

0.003

(0.031)

0.003

Extroversion

0.024

(0.022)

0.031

Conscientious

0.032

(0.030)

0.037

Neuroticism

0.014

(0.026)

0.019

Openness

0.037

(0.027)

0.044

Authoritarianism

−0.173

(0.036)

−0.155 ***

Conservatism

−0.023

(0.018)

−0.041

Self/Friend
Arrested

Note: Northeast was used as the regional reference group. *** indicates p < 0.001, **
p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Conservatism was measured on a scale ranging from 1 (Very Liberal)
to 7 (Very Conservative). The Big Five scales ranged from 1 to 7; authoritarianism was 1
to 6.

Despite these significant differences, the full model including
all the personality variables explains only 5.8 percent of the variance in privacy expectations. The bare demographics in Model 1
explain only 2.5 percent. These are interesting results from a social scientific standpoint, but they have little policy effect. A
white, non-Hispanic college graduate who is 25 should be expected under Model 1 to average about 3.51 on these privacy expectation questions. A white, non-Hispanic high school graduate
who is 65 should be expected to average 3.14. Effectively, these
changes in age and education move the estimate up or down approximately 0.19 on our five-point scale. Consider the consequences of adding or subtracting 0.19 from each of the searches.
The only search that gets meaningfully closer to the midpoint is
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historical cell-site data, which goes from 3.29 to 3.10. This would
still be significantly above the midpoint,56 indicating that privacy
is more expected than not. The other eight searches would barely
come closer.
The data obtained here do concern only a subset of possible
search activities. These activities were originally chosen because
they represented interesting questions at the intersection of law
and technology. It is possible that, for other searches, we may see
some gender differences. For example, some searches of the body
may implicate different gender norms.57
In our other scholarship, we have proposed that judges rely
on social science evidence to inform their judgments about
whether reasonable expectations of privacy exist under Katz. A
personalized approach to criminal procedure law might contemplate expectations of privacy that are tied to the gender, race, or
some other attribute of the surveillance’s target. The data we present here indicate that—at least for this broad array of searches—
it would not be useful to consider a citizen’s demographic or personality characteristics in determining what expectations of privacy society ought to regard as reasonable. Some demographic
and personality differences in privacy expectations are statistically significant, but they are not powerful enough to warrant divergent legal treatment, even on the assumption that such personalization is normatively unproblematic.
C. Miranda
Another body of criminal procedure law in which individual
differences may be relevant involves knowledge of one’s right to
counsel and Fifth Amendment rights. Miranda v Arizona58 requires law enforcement to inform arrestees of these constitutional
rights before beginning an interrogation that will be used to collect admissible evidence against the arrestee.59 In some limited
56

t(1199) = 2.38, p < 0.01.
See, for example, Wilcher v City of Wilmington, 139 F3d 366, 376 (3d Cir 1998)
(discussing monitoring the bathroom use of male and female firefighters during drug testing). We thank Victoria Schwartz for this observation.
58 384 US 436 (1966).
59 Id at 467. The large body of empirical research on Miranda includes Paul G. Cassell
and Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects
of Miranda, 43 UCLA L Rev 839, 860, 895 (1996) (reporting that Miranda rights were
invoked in 16.3 percent of cases studied and that suspects with a prior criminal record did
not invoke their rights significantly more often); Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation
Room, 86 J Crim L & Crimin 266, 275–77 (1996); Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda
57
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respects, the law already personalizes Miranda warnings. For example, arrestees who do not speak English should be read their
Miranda rights in a language they understand, and courts sometimes struggle with issues involving mistranslations.60 To take
another example, a New Hampshire Supreme Court case called
State v Benoit61 strongly encourages law enforcement officers in
that state to read juvenile arrestees a version of Miranda warnings that is designed to be comprehensible to minors.62 Police officers who do not read the special juvenile version of Miranda to
juveniles run the risk that any subsequent confession will be inadmissible.63 This form of Miranda personalization is predicated
on research suggesting that children have a harder time understanding the content of the Miranda warnings than adults do.64
Although the Supreme Court has been relatively forgiving of
minor variations in the content of the Miranda warnings and resists the idea of requiring the police to follow an invariable
script,65 lower courts on occasion view deviations from the standard
script to be constitutionally problematic. Consider the Seventh
Circuit’s 2012 opinion in United States v Wysinger:66
Agent Rehg veered slightly from the standard warning language in a few respects. A potentially serious misstatement
of the Miranda warning occurred when Agent Rehg told
Wysinger that he had the “right to talk to a lawyer for advice
before we ask any questions or have one—have an attorney
with you during questioning.” Taken literally, Agent Rehg

Revisited, 86 J Crim L & Crimin 621, 632–45 (1996); Richard Rogers, et al, “Everyone Knows
Their Miranda Rights”: Implicit Assumptions and Countervailing Evidence, 16 Psychology,
Pub Pol & L 300, 307–13 (2010).
60 See Richard Rogers, et al, Spanish Translations of Miranda Warnings and the Totality of the Circumstances, 33 L & Hum Behav 61, 61–62 (2009).
61 490 A2d 295 (NH 1985).
62 Id at 304, 306–07.
63 The court says that, if the special warnings are not used, the courts will presume
that the warnings the juvenile received were inadequate. Id at 304.
64 See Raymond Chao, Mirandizing Kids: Not as Simple as A-B-C, 21 Whittier L Rev 521,
526 (2000); Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical
Analysis, 68 Cal L Rev 1134, 1151–60 (1980); Larry E. Holtz, Miranda in a Juvenile Setting:
A Child’s Right to Silence, 78 J Crim L & Crimin 534, 550–51 (1987).
65 See, for example, Duckworth v Eagan, 492 US 195, 204–05 (1989); Florida v Powell,
559 US 50, 60–64 (2010).
66 683 F3d 784 (7th Cir 2012).
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told Wysinger that he could talk to an attorney before questioning or during questioning. In fact, Wysinger had a right
to consult an attorney both before and during questioning.67
Largely (though not entirely) on the basis of this subtle deviation,
the court deemed Wysinger’s statements during an interrogation
inadmissible.68
This variation in the content of Miranda warnings, with
courts considering enhanced-clarity warnings given to juveniles
in Benoit, standard warnings for adults, and inadequate warnings in cases like Wysinger, lends itself to the possibility that different types of warnings may be ideal for different kinds of people.69 Perhaps the Benoit warnings are particularly helpful for
poorly educated respondents or those with less experience in the
criminal justice system. And maybe the ambiguous Wysinger
warnings have a significant impact on members of those groups
but affect neither highly educated respondents nor people who
watch a lot of police procedural shows on television. We sought to
test those hypotheses.
Participants in this study were presented with a scenario describing a car accident after which they were arrested for reckless
driving. In our control condition (no explicit Miranda warning),
participants were simply told “A police officer . . . places you under arrest for reckless driving after surveying the crash scene. At
the police station, the officer begins asking you questions about
the collision after informing you of your legal rights.” This subtle
reference informs members of the control group that they have
been informed of their legal rights without telling them what any
of those rights actually are. This instruction is necessary because,
in a hypothetical situation in which respondents were not read
their rights, the police’s ability to do anything with subsequent
statements made in interrogations would be substantially curtailed, changing the correct answers to the true/false Miranda
comprehension questions we administered to subjects, as we describe below.
In the three other experimental conditions, an explicit Miranda
warning is given. The text of these warnings is included in
Appendix F. One warning was intended to be the “standard” version

67

Id at 798 (emphasis omitted).
Id at 800–03.
69 See Porat and Strahilevitz, 112 Mich L Rev at 1470–76 (cited in note 4) (discussing
the personalization of information disclosures).
68
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of Miranda: “You have the right to remain silent. Anything you
say can be used against you in a court of law. . . .” Another was an
“enhanced” and slightly longer version based on Benoit, which
went into greater detail. And the third and last was the “degraded”
version of Miranda held insufficient in Wysinger because it inappropriately implied that the suspect had to choose between having an attorney present before questioning or during questioning.
We devised a test of Miranda knowledge consisting of thirteen
true/false questions. The text of these appears in Appendix G.
Though overall performance was quite good, there was a fair bit
of variation by question. For example, nearly everyone in all four
experimental conditions (92 percent) knew it was true that “you
do not have to say anything to the police, but you can speak to the
police if you want to,” but only 54.5 percent of participants correctly stated that it was false that “the police can interview you,
but they can only use what you say to prosecute you if you make
a signed confession.”70
Participants’ scores on this Miranda quiz were analyzed using the same basic regression as in the other sections. The results,
which are presented in Table 5 below, were surprising. First, none
of the Miranda warnings significantly improved performance (see
the coefficients for the “Any Warning” variable). We prevented
subjects from skipping past the Miranda instructions for at least
thirty seconds (though they could have spent a longer time with
them if they wished), yet still there was no improvement. And time
spent with neither the Miranda instructions nor the Miranda
quiz page, which reprinted the instructions, correlated with performance. Also, our “enhanced” and “degraded” Miranda variants
were no different from the standard warning.
Second, the version of Miranda that was chosen made no significant difference in terms of subjects understanding their constitutional rights—even when we focus on responses to those
questions for which a clear warning would seem to accomplish the
most. Two of our true/false questions stand out in this respect.
70 Several papers by psychologists have previously examined research subjects’ comprehension of their Miranda rights. See, for example, Richard Rogers, et al, General
Knowledge and Misknowledge of Miranda Rights: Are Effective Miranda Advisements Still
Necessary?, 19 Psychology, Pub Pol & L 432, 434–38 (2013) (showing that, in a free recall
task, 87 percent of subjects knew they had a right to remain silent and 80 percent of subjects knew they had a right to counsel); Rogers, et al, 31 Behav Sci & L at 403–04 (cited in
note 36); Darby B. Winningham, Richard Rogers, and Eric Y. Drogin, Miranda Misconceptions of Criminal Detainees: Differences Based on Age Groups and Prior Arrests, 17 Intl J
Forensic Mental Health 13, 18–20 (2018).
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The first asked respondents whether this statement was true or
false: “If you a request a lawyer, you must choose whether to have
the lawyer present either before questioning or during questioning. A lawyer cannot be present both before and during questioning.” Respondents who saw the enhanced Miranda warning
(which stated, in pertinent part: “You have the right to talk to a
lawyer before any questioning. You have the right to have the
lawyer with you while you are being questioned. The lawyer will
help you decide what you should do or say.”) were not significantly
more likely to answer the question correctly than those who saw
the defective Wysinger warning. And neither group performed significantly better than the control group members, who were
shown no explicit warning.71
Similarly, when asked whether this statement is true or
false—“If you do not answer any of the police’s questions you may
be punished for being in contempt of court.”—respondents who
saw the enhanced warning (which read in pertinent part: “You do
not have to talk to anyone or answer any questions we ask you.
You will not be punished for deciding not to talk to us.”) did not
significantly outperform those who saw the standard Miranda
warning or the defective warning (both of which reminded subjects of their “right to remain silent”), nor did they provide correct
answers significantly more frequently than those who received no
explicit warning.72
Third, in terms of demographic correlates, greater education
and, especially, age were strongly related to improved Miranda
knowledge,73 and being African American was related to weaker
knowledge. Because the dependent variable here is a percentile,
one can think of the unstandardized coefficients below in terms of
percentage points. For every year older a participant was, the participant did 0.2 percent better. This means that it would take a
difference of about forty years to score one full question differently on the test (each question counting for about 7.7 percent of

71 The percentages of respondents providing incorrect answers were 30.1 percent of
those given no warning, 29.5 percent of those given the standard warning, 28.5 percent of
those given the enhanced warning, and 29.9 percent of those given the defective warning.
None of these differences is statistically significant.
72 The percent of respondents providing incorrect answers were 21.3 percent of those
given no warning, 21.0 percent of those given the standard warning, 15.6 percent of those
given the enhanced warning, and 15.4 percent of those given the defective warning. These
results were again not statistically significant.
73 Our results here replicate those of Rogers, et al, 19 Psychology, Pub Pol & L at 438
(cited in note 70), which studied a sample drawn from the Dallas jury pool.
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the total score). This is a sample of entirely adult participants,
however, and these data show that additional years are beneficial
even among those above 18 years of age. Arrest experience was
also related to improved knowledge (almost 5 percent better on
the test),74 as was conscientiousness (1.5 percent for each point of
a possible 7). Authoritarian personality propensity was related to
weaker knowledge (−2.5 percent for each point of a possible 6).
Although we hypothesized that subjects who regularly watch police procedural television shows might perform better on the
true/false test than subjects who did not, the result actually went
in the opposite direction, though it was not significant.
We ran a further series of regressions examining whether the
effects of age and education—two of the better predictors—depended on the Miranda warning provided. There were no significant interactions between those factors and either getting any
warning or getting the enhanced or defective warnings.75 This
means that those warnings were not having significantly different
effects on people depending on their age or educational attainment.

74 Since arrest experience would, if direct, involve being given the Miranda warning,
we added this in a separate step in this analysis rather than including it in the first model
as we did for the other domains.
75 The model included all of the controls from Model 3.
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TABLE 5: PREDICTORS OF KNOWLEDGE OF ONE’S MIRANDA RIGHTS

(Constant)
Female
Hispanic
African American
Education
Age
Midwest
South
West

Model 1

Model 2

Unstd
Std
Coeff
Coeff
0.632
(0.021)
0.000 −0.001
(0.009)
−0.007 −0.018
(0.013)
−0.026 −0.055
(0.014)
0.016
0.109
(0.004)
***
0.002
0.237
(0.000)
***
0.014
0.035
(0.014)
0.013
0.038
(0.012)
0.018
0.046
(0.014)

Unstd
Std
Coeff
Coeff
0.616
(0.022)
0.000
0.000
(0.009)
−0.008
−0.019
(0.013)
−0.026 −0.054
(0.014)
0.016
0.107
(0.004)
***
0.002
0.238
(0.000)
***
0.016
0.040
(0.014)
0.013
0.041
(0.012)
0.019
0.049
(0.014)
0.019
0.052
(0.013)
−0.002 −0.006
(0.012)
0.004
0.012
(0.012)

Any Warning
Enhanced Warn
Defective Warn
Self or Friend
Arrested
Watch Crime
Shows

Model 3
Unstd
Coeff
0.596
(0.025)
0.004
(0.009)
−0.006
(0.013)
−0.029
(0.014)
0.018
(0.004)
0.002
(0.000)
0.012
(0.014)
0.006
(0.012)
0.015
(0.014)
0.019
(0.012)
−0.001
(0.012)
0.006
(0.012)
0.051
(0.009)
−0.005
(0.003)

Agreeableness
Extroversion
Conscientious
Neuroticism
Openness
Authoritarianism
Conservatism
R2

0.08

0.08

0.11

Std
Coeff

0.012

−0.014
−0.062
*
0.120
***
0.248
***
0.030
0.019
0.039
0.050

−0.002
0.017
0.159
***
−0.041

Model 4
Unstd
Coeff
0.559
(0.052)
0.001
(0.009)
−0.013
(0.013)
−0.037
(0.014)
0.014
(0.004)
0.002
(0.000)
0.012
(0.014)
0.011
(0.012)
0.019
(0.014)
0.019
(0.012)
−0.004
(0.012)
0.003
(0.012)
0.048
(0.009)
−0.004
(0.003)
0.005
(0.005)
−0.004
(0.003)
0.015
(0.005)
0.006
(0.004)
0.006
(0.004)
−0.024
(0.006)
−0.001
(0.003)

Std
Coeff

0.003

−0.031
−0.078
**
0.093
**
0.247
***
0.031
0.033
0.047
0.050

−0.011
0.009
0.151
***
−0.029
0.034

−0.037
0.107
**
0.048
0.046

−0.134
***

−0.005

0.14

Note: Northeast was used as the regional reference group. *** indicates p < 0.001, **
p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. The normal Miranda warning serves as the reference category for the
enhanced and defective warnings. Conservatism was measured on a scale ranging from 1
(Very Liberal) to 7 (Very Conservative). The Big Five scales ranged from 1 to 7; authoritarianism was 1 to 6.
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These data provide interesting insights about the benefits of
personalization, which would seem to be insubstantial in the context of tailored Miranda warnings. But the data are revealing in
other respects as well. In the present day and age, neither the
Miranda warnings themselves nor an enhanced version of those
warnings significantly improve respondents’ understanding of
the legal rights about which Miranda purports to inform them.
This result is consistent with recent scholarship that suggests little benefit from repeated Miranda warnings to detainees and
with broader scholarship that expresses general skepticism about
the value of information disclosures aimed at lay audiences.76 As
one study of juveniles’ understanding of their Miranda rights
puts it, warnings that “explain components and protections more
fully [have] resulted in much longer warnings that likely decrease
Miranda understanding rather than improving it.”77
The lack of variation among those receiving enhanced warnings, degraded warnings, standard warnings, and no warnings at
all suggests that cases like Wysinger, which use relatively minor
deviations from the standard Miranda warnings to exclude confessions, are wrongly decided.78 By the same token, Supreme
Court cases like Duckworth v Eagan79 and Florida v Powell,80
which take a relatively permissive approach toward imperfect
readings of Miranda rights, are likely correct. Had the arrestees in
those cases heard a typical or even enhanced version of the Miranda
warnings, it likely would have not changed their understandings
of their rights, nor would it have been likely to change their subsequent behavior. In sum, a secondary but important takeaway
of this Essay is that the kinds of legal issues routinely presented
in inadequate Miranda warning cases like Wysinger, Duckworth,
and Powell are amenable to empirical resolution: one can examine
how a standard warning and the nonstandard warning given in a

76 See, for example, Rogers, et al, 31 Behav Sci & L at 405–07 (cited in note 36). See
also Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, More than You Wanted to Know: The Failure
of Mandated Disclosure 55–57 (Princeton 2014).
77 Winningham, Rogers, and Drogin, 17 Intl J Forensic Mental Health at 22 (cited in
note 70).
78 One could argue that strict adherence to the approved version of Miranda is valuable for other reasons, perhaps out of a general preference for bright-line rules. These data
do not speak to the merits of those arguments, but they do suggest that small variations
will not degrade comprehension.
79 492 US 195 (1989).
80 559 US 50 (2010).
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particular case each affects subjects’ respective understandings of
their legal rights.
Despite this dreary picture of warning efficacy, we do not
think that these results necessarily mean that Miranda is useless. First, it’s striking that lay respondents overwhelmingly
knew the answers to basic factual questions about Miranda, with
respondents answering the least challenging true/false questions
correctly even when they were not presented with any warnings.
Recall that 92 percent knew the most basic part of Miranda: that
they did not need to talk to the police. We believe these results
indicate significant legal knowledge on the part of the lay public,
knowledge that plausibly has been transmitted through previous
exposure to the Miranda warnings (though watching lots of Law
& Order episodes appears not to have helped).81
Other research suggests that jail inmates generally understand their basic Miranda rights, though their knowledge is imperfect, and very difficult questions that aren’t directly covered
by the warnings trip them up.82 This penetration of the Miranda
warnings may mean that eliminating the Miranda requirement
would, given enough time, result in citizens having a diminished
understanding of their legal rights.83 Second, it is fair to wonder
about the external validity of our experiments. Respondents may
respond differently to a hypothetical in which they imagine themselves being taken into custody than they would were they actually placed under arrest. It may be that people are prone to forget
their rights when under such strain or that warnings are listened
to even more attentively, altering comprehension.84 Alternatively,
it is possible that real-world Miranda warnings are directed at
people who are so distraught and flooded with emotions that the
81 Some research has suggested that pop culture is now generally omitting Miranda
warnings, with them being absent from most episodes of recent police procedurals. See
Ronald Steiner, Rebecca Bauer, and Rohit Talwar, The Rise and Fall of the Miranda Warnings in Popular Culture, 59 Cleve St L Rev 219, 231–35 (2011).
82 See Rogers, et al, 31 Behav Sci & L at 406 (cited in note 36). For example, research
suggests that detainees often do not realize that Miranda applies to noncustodial situations or that, during an interrogation, law enforcement can falsely claim that eyewitnesses
have identified them at crime scenes. See Rogers, et al, 19 Psychology, Pub Pol & L at 437
(cited in note 70). These misconceptions are unfortunate, but they are not errors that the
Miranda warnings themselves are designed to correct.
83 Our previous research suggests it is unlikely that citizens’ understandings would
change on a dime, and any immediate changes might not persist. See Kugler and Strahilevitz,
84 U Chi L Rev at 1794 (cited in note 49).
84 There is a literature on this that tries to simulate mock arrests for research subjects, see Rogers, et al, 19 Psychology, Pub Pol & L at 439 (cited in note 70), but no research
that examines subjects actually being interrogated on suspicion of having broken the law.
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warnings do even less to enhance citizens’ understandings of their
legal rights.85
CONCLUSION
A data-driven approach to personalization may look attractive in comparison to the status quo, in which judges and justices
are forced to rely on their own, perhaps idiosyncratic, views about
what’s reasonable or custodial. And we should not kid ourselves—
the criminal justice system already tolerates a degree of disparate
treatment across protected classes. Personalization based on
race, age, and sex is not constitutionally unthinkable even though
it raises hard normative questions and should generate careful
constitutional scrutiny.
Personalization could, in principle, benefit otherwise disadvantaged minority groups. Our data could have shown that African
Americans see police requests for permission to search as more
coercive or that those of low educational attainment need carefully tailored Miranda warnings. At least in theory, the upside of
a personalized Fourth Amendment could be significant for these
groups—it might, paradoxically, promote equal treatment under
the law. Had those been our findings, the next step would have
been to address those hard questions.
Our data do not support this story, however. Though we find
several statistically significant relationships between demographic characteristics and relevant outcomes, the effect sizes are
small. Even were it normatively and logistically costless to personalize on all these dimensions, little would be gained. Demographic and personality factors have only modest effects on expectations and beliefs relevant to criminal procedure doctrine.
Personalization of this sort does not appear to be worth the trouble.
Our data are less relevant to another kind of personalization:
the kind pursued by machine learning and the techniques of big
data. We tested how basic demographic variables, including those
representing protected class status, were related to outcomes. But
one could take a black box approach, trying to sort people based
on all possible factors. Though the federal courts have approved
of some types of personalization at the individual level, neither

85 For an exploration of related issues involving interrogation and a clever way to
make progress in experimental settings, see Melissa B. Russano, et al, Investigating True
and False Confessions within a Novel Experimental Paradigm, 16 Psychological Sci 481,
483–84 (2005).
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courts nor scholars have examined in depth how criminal procedure could incorporate the kind of automated big data personalization that companies like Google and Netflix have introduced.
Personalization by these methods would be less about protecting
or tailoring for identified classes of people and more about customizing based on individual predilections.
Big data personalization presumably could be more accurate
than what we did here. There is research suggesting that personalization via machine learning improves the relevance of search
engine results by a little more than 9 percent.86 And machine
learning is starting to make inroads in predicting more complex
kinds of human behavior too. For example, these techniques have
shown some significant promise in making bail determinations,
with a machine learning algorithm projected to be able to reduce
crime by almost 19 percent while holding the release rate constant.87 Machine learning’s advantage over human decisionmaking seems less pronounced in the hiring and firing context,
with recent research suggesting that using machine learning to
decommission the bottom 10 percent of new law enforcement
hires (replacing them with median hires) could reduce police
shootings by approximately 5 percent.88 That said, machine learning is not a panacea for prediction. To the extent that machine
learning attaches relevance to factors that, unlike race, gender,
age, or education levels, can be easily altered, it is susceptible to
gaming strategies that can compromise its efficacy.89
Despite these possibilities for the future, the magnitude of
our effects in the present research is not large enough to justify
personalization. This conclusion means that some very difficult
86 Hema Yoganarasimhan, Search Personalization Using Machine Learning *5 (unpublished manuscript, July 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/T2W4-CAQF. See also Michael
Crawford, et al, Survey of Review Spam Detection Using Machine Learning Techniques, 2
J Big Data 23, 39–40 (2015) (reviewing the literature on advances in detecting spam and
fake reviews on sites like TripAdvisor and Yelp).
87 See Jon Kleinberg, et al, Human Decisions and Machine Predictions *8 (NBER
working paper, Feb 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/8FPY-Y4A7.
88 See Aaron Chalfin, et al, Productivity and Selection of Human Capital with Machine Learning, 106 Am Econ Rev 124, 125 (2016). Professor Aaron Chalfin and coauthors’
4.81 percent reduction estimate arguably understates the effect somewhat because officer
assignments may be nonrandom and systematically place better officers in more difficult
situations.
89 For discussion of the problems raised by adversarial machine learning, see Marco
Barreno, et al, The Security of Machine Learning, 81 Machine Learning 121, 123–24
(2010); Battista Biggio, et al, Evasion Attacks against Machine Learning at Test Time, in
Hendrik Blockeel, et al, eds, Machine Learning and Knowledge Discovery in Databases III,
387, 400–01 (Springer 2013).
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normative questions about the appropriateness of further personalizing this body of constitutional law can wait for another day.
APPENDIX
A. Demographics of the Sample
Female (%)

52.3

Age (years)
Median

46

Mean
Political Orientation

46.86 (17.01)
4.05 (1.73)

Race/Ethnicity (%)
White
Black or AA

83.4
13.0

Indian or Native
SE Asian

1.1
4.5

Hawaiian/Pacific
Other or multiracial

0.6
7.4

Hispanic

17.6

Education (%)
Less than HS
HS Diploma/GED

7.4
36.4

Two-Year College
Four-Year College

29.3
17.8

Graduate Degree

9.1
1,200

Note: For age and political orientation, the
numbers in parentheses represent standard
deviations. Political orientation was measured
on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (Very
Liberal) to 7 (Very Conservative).
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B. Regression Table for Expected Nervousness during Searches
Model 1
Unstd Coeff
(Constant)

2.900 (0.187)

Female

0.325 (0.081)

Model 2
Std Coeff

Unstd Coeff

Std Coeff

2.775 (0.439)
0.121 ***

0.242 (0.081)

0.090 **

Hispanic

−0.099 (0.112) −0.028

−0.111 (0.108) −0.031

African
American

−0.214 (0.123) −0.054

−0.135 (0.120) −0.034

Education

0.104 (0.037)

0.084 **

0.117 (0.036)

0.094 ***

Age

−0.004 (0.002) −0.057

−0.002 (0.002) −0.026

Midwest

−0.091 (0.122) −0.028

−0.095 (0.117) −0.029

South

−0.188 (0.108) −0.068

−0.138 (0.104) −0.050

West

−0.092 (0.124) −0.027

−0.061 (0.119) −0.018

Self/Friend
Arrested
Agreeableness

0.111 (0.079)

0.041

0.077 (0.076)

0.028

0.116 (0.041)

0.094 **

Extroversion

−0.075 (0.029) −0.073 *

Conscientious

−0.020 (0.040) −0.017

Neuroticism

0.255 (0.034)

0.252 ***

Openness

−0.046 (0.035) −0.041

Authoritarianism

−0.190 (0.047) −0.125 ***

Conservatism

−0.023 (0.024) −0.029

Note: Higher numbers indicate greater nervousness. Northeast was used as the regional
reference group. *** indicates p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Conservatism was measured on a scale ranging from 1 (Very Liberal) to 7 (Very Conservative). The Big Five scales
ranged from 1 to 7; authoritarianism was 1 to 6. Model 1 R2 = 0.022; Model 2 R2 = 0.109.
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C. Regression Table for Expectation the Officer Would Draw
His Gun during the Car Stop
Model 1
Unstd Coeff
(Constant)
Female

Model 2
Std Coeff

2.533 (0.159)

Unstd Coeff

Std Coeff

3.476 (0.383)

−0.076 (0.069) −0.032

−0.032 (0.071) −0.014

Hispanic

0.195 (0.095)

0.062 *

0.167 (0.094)

0.053

African
American

0.747 (0.104)

0.211 ***

0.749 (0.104)

0.211 ***

Education

0.056 (0.031)

0.051

0.038 (0.032)

0.034

Age

−0.013 (0.002) −0.180 *** −0.010 (0.002) −0.139 ***

Midwest

−0.200 (0.103) −0.069

−0.212 (0.102) −0.073 *

South

−0.175 (0.092) −0.071

−0.143 (0.091) −0.058

West

−0.145 (0.105) −0.049

−0.155 (0.104) −0.052

Self/Friend
Arrested
Agreeableness
Extroversion
Conscientious
Neuroticism

0.153 (0.067)

0.064 *

0.113 (0.066)

0.047

−0.071 (0.036) −0.065 *
0.047 (0.025)

0.052

−0.065 (0.035) −0.061
0.030 (0.030)

0.034

Openness

−0.004 (0.031) −0.004

Authoritarianism

−0.111 (0.041) −0.082 **

Conservatism

−0.037 (0.021) −0.053

Note: Higher numbers indicate greater expectation of the event. Northeast was used as
the regional reference group. *** indicates p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Conservatism
was measured on a scale ranging from 1 (Very Liberal) to 7 (Very Conservative). The Big
Five scales ranged from 1 to 7; authoritarianism was 1 to 6. Model 1 R2 = 0.107; Model 2
R2 = 0.139.
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D. Regression Table for Expectation the Officer Would Plant
Evidence during the Car Stop
Model 1
Unstd Coeff
(Constant)
Female

Model 2
Std Coeff

2.533 (0.161)

Unstd Coeff

Std Coeff

3.430 (0.386)

−0.081 (0.070) −0.034

−0.042 (0.071) −0.018

Hispanic

0.113 (0.096)

0.036

0.069 (0.095)

0.022

African
American

0.695 (0.106)

0.197 ***

0.696 (0.105)

0.197 ***

Education

0.015 (0.032)

0.014

Age

−0.010 (0.032) −0.009

−0.010 (0.002) −0.140 *** −0.006 (0.002) −0.090 **

Midwest

0.070 (0.105)

0.024

0.053 (0.103)

0.018

South

0.004 (0.093)

0.002

0.042 (0.092)

0.017

West

−0.008 (0.107) −0.003

Self/Friend
Arrested
Agreeableness
Extroversion
Conscientious

0.146 (0.068)

0.061 *

−0.008 (0.105) −0.003
0.095 (0.067)

0.040

−0.048 (0.036) −0.044
0.015 (0.026)

0.017

−0.068 (0.035) −0.065

Neuroticism

0.060 (0.030)

0.067 *

Openness

0.035 (0.031)

0.035

Authoritarianism

−0.183 (0.042) −0.136 ***

Conservatism

−0.026 (0.021) −0.038

Note: Higher numbers indicate greater expectation of the event. Northeast was used as
the regional reference group. *** indicates p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Conservatism
was measured on a scale ranging from 1 (Very Liberal) to 7 (Very Conservative). The Big
Five scales ranged from 1 to 7; authoritarianism was 1 to 6. Model 1 R2 = 0.074; Model 2
R2 = 0.118.
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E. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Questions
Participants were asked, “Would it violate people’s reasonable
expectations of privacy if law enforcement:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

F.

Used remote activation software to turn on the webcam on
their laptop without their permission?
Obtained from their Internet Service Provider copies of
emails exchanged between them and someone else?
Used facial recognition software to check whether any of
the fans entering the Super Bowl stadium match images
in a Department of Homeland Security database?
Installed a video camera to watch a public park where
criminal activity has recently occurred?
Obtained from their cell phone company stored information about whether their cell phone was near a particular location on a particular day?
Used a fake cell tower to trick their phone into giving the
police more accurate information about where the phone
is?
Contacted Uber and obtained a map of every trip a customer has taken using that ride-hailing service for the last
month?
Used a high-powered lens to take photographs through a
window of a home from across the street?
Flew a camera-equipped drone over a house at a height of
seventy feet to take pictures of the backyard, which is otherwise not viewable from the surrounding properties?”

Miranda Vignettes

Control:
Suppose that you have been driving a car and gotten into a
serious collision with another vehicle. You are unharmed but
a driver in another vehicle was not wearing a seatbelt and
was killed in the collision. A police officer arrives quickly at
the scene and places you under arrest for reckless driving after surveying the crash scene. At the police station, the officer
begins asking you questions about the collision after informing you of your legal rights.
Standard warning:
Suppose that you have been driving a car and gotten into a
serious collision with another vehicle. You are unharmed but
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a driver in another vehicle was not wearing a seatbelt and
was killed in the collision. A police officer arrives quickly at
the scene and places you under arrest for reckless driving after surveying the crash scene.
When placing you under arrest, the officer tells you that he
is required by law to inform you of your legal rights. He then
says, “You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say
can be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to
talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions. You
have the right to have a lawyer with you during questioning.
If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you
without cost to you before questioning.” At the police station,
the officer begins asking you questions about the collision.
Enhanced warning:
Suppose that you have been driving a car and gotten into a
serious collision with another vehicle. You are unharmed but
a driver in another vehicle was not wearing a seatbelt and
was killed in the collision. A police officer arrives quickly at
the scene and places you under arrest for reckless driving after surveying the crash scene.
When placing you under arrest, the officer tells you that he
is required by law to inform you of your legal rights. He then
says, “You do not have to talk to anyone or answer any questions we ask you. You will not be punished for deciding not to
talk to us. If you say anything, what you say can be used in a
court to prove that you may have broken the law. You have
the right to talk to a lawyer before any questioning. You have
the right to have the lawyer with you while you are being
questioned. The lawyer will help you decide what you should
do or say. If you decide you want a lawyer, we will not question you until you have been allowed to talk to the lawyer. If
you want to talk to a lawyer and cannot afford one, we will
get you a lawyer at no cost to you before any questioning begins.” At the police station, the officer begins asking you
questions about the collision.
Defective Warning:
Suppose that you have been driving a car and gotten into a
serious collision with another vehicle. You are unharmed but
a driver in another vehicle was not wearing a seatbelt and
was killed in the collision. A police officer arrives quickly at
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the scene and places you under arrest for reckless driving after surveying the crash scene.
When placing you under arrest, the officer tells you that he
is required by law to inform you of your legal rights. He then
says, “Before we ask any questions, you must understand you
have a right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used
against you in court. You have a right to talk to a lawyer for
advice before we ask any questions or have an attorney with
you during questioning. If you can’t afford a lawyer, one will
be appointed for you before we ask any questions.” At the police station, the officer begins asking you questions about the
collision.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227065

526

The University of Chicago Law Review

[86:489

G. Miranda Questions
These questions were administered in random order.
Correct
Response

% Correct

If you speak before asking for a lawyer, the police
may use whatever you say to prosecute you if they
believe you have broken the law.

TRUE

93.8

You do not have to say anything to the police, but you
can speak to the police if you want to.

TRUE

92.0

If you decide you want to speak with the police without a lawyer present, you can later choose to stop
talking and ask for a lawyer. If you do, the police have
to stop questioning you until the lawyer arrives

TRUE

90.8

If you cannot afford a lawyer but want one anyway,
the government will assign you a lawyer who does not
have to share what you tell him with the police

TRUE

87.4

If you tell the police officer you want to speak with a
lawyer, the police may not question you until after
you have spoken with the lawyer unless you restart
the conversation.

TRUE

86.2

If you request a lawyer, you do not need to tell the
police what you know after you have spoken with the
lawyer.

TRUE

77.1

You do not have to tell your lawyer everything you
know if you request a lawyer.

TRUE

48.8

The police can interview you, but they can only use
what you say to prosecute you if you make a signed
confession.

FALSE

54.5

If you cannot afford a lawyer but want one anyway,
the government will assign you a lawyer who works
for the police department.

FALSE

66.4

If you a request a lawyer, you must choose whether
to have the lawyer present either before questioning
or during questioning. A lawyer cannot be present
both before and during questioning.

FALSE

70.5

If you do not answer any of the police’s questions you
may be punished for being in contempt of court.

FALSE

81.7

You have to answer all the police officer’s questions.

FALSE

85.9

If you request a lawyer, the police officer will prevent
you from being released on bail.

FALSE

88.0

Question
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